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Abstract—The application of machine learning to software fault
injection data has been shown to be an effective approach for
the generation of efficient error detection mechanisms (EDMs).
However, such approaches to the design of EDMs have invariably
adopted a fault model with a single-fault assumption, limiting
the practical relevance of the detectors and their evaluation.
Software containing more than a single fault is commonplace,
with prominent safety standards recognising that critical failures
are often the result of unlikely or unforeseen combinations of
faults. This paper addresses this shortcoming, demonstrating
that it is possible to generate similarly efficient EDMs under
more realistic fault models. In particular, it is shown that (i)
efficient EDMs can be designed using fault data collected under
models accounting for the occurrence of simultaneous faults, (ii)
exhaustive fault injection under a simultaneous bit flip model
can yield improvements to EDM efficiency, and (iii) exhaustive
fault injection under a simultaneous bit flip model can made
non-exhaustive, reducing the resource costs of experimentation
to practicable levels, without sacrificing resultant EDM efficiency.
Keywords-Detection; Error; Fault; Injection; Machine Learning
I. INTRODUCTION
The design of error detection mechanisms (EDMs) is integral
to the development of dependable software systems [1]. EDMs
are fundamentally concerned with the detection of erroneous
software states. Once detected by an EDM, erroneous software
states can be handled by error recovery mechanisms (ERMs) to
maintain proper function. A failure to contain the propagation
of erroneous state is known to make recovery more difficult,
leading to a focus on the efficiency of EDMs through measures
such as coverage and latency [2], [3].
The effectiveness of an EDM has been shown to depend on
two factors. These factors are (i) the error detection predicate
that it implements and (ii) its location in a software system [4].
This gives rise to two related problems. Firstly, the EDM
design problem, which is concerned with the derivation of an
error detection predicate over program variables that can be
used for the detection of erroneous system states. Secondly,
the EDM location problem, which is concerned with the
identification of those software locations at which an EDM
will be most effective. Though often treated as orthogonal for
simplicity, the interaction of the implemented error detection
predicate and the software location are demonstrably critical
to the efficiency of an EDM [5], [6].
The efficiency of a particular EDM can be characterised by
completeness and accuracy [4]. Completeness is the capability
of an EDM to detect erroneous states, i.e., its associated true
positive rate. In contrast, accuracy is the capability of an
EDM to avoid incorrectly detecting erroneous states, i.e., its
associated false positive rate. An erroneous state is one that
will lead to system failure if the error is not handled, where a
failure is characterised as a violation of a system specification.
An EDM that is complete and accurate is commonly known
as a perfect detector. Due to implementation constraints, it is
not generally possible to generate or guarantee the existence
of a perfect detector for a particular software location [7].
The role of a fault model is to provide a means for analysing
the response of software system to the presence a well defined
set of faults, such that appropriate EDMs and ERMs can be
designed to impart dependability. The assumption that faults
do not occur simultaneously or interact is a limitation of many
fault models and the software fault injection frameworks that
implement them, not least because software containing more
than a single fault are now commonplace [8]. In addition,
numerous existing safety standards recognise that critical
system failures are often the result of unlikely or unforeseen
interactions combinations of faults [9].
It has been shown that efficient error detection predicates
for EDMs can be designed through the application of machine
learning algorithms to data sets generated during software fault
injection [10]. This approach demonstrated, under a transient
data value fault model, that it was possible to generate error
detection predicates for specified locations with a true positive
rate of nearly 100% and a false positive rate close to 0%
for the detection of failure-inducing states. As is consistent
with the overwhelming majority of software fault injection
frameworks, these results were achieved under a single-fault
assumption, calling into question their relevance in the context
of real-world software systems.
More generally, when generating error detection predicates
for EDMs through the application of machine learning to fault
injection data, an implication of the single-fault assumption
is that the efficiency properties of the EDMs are principally
relevant in the context of a single fault, thus limiting their
application in practical software systems. This paper directly
addresses this issue by demonstrating that efficient EDMs
can be designed using fault injection data collected under
models accounting for the occurrence of simultaneous faults.
Moreover, it is shown that the adoption of such fault models
in fault injection can yield EDMs with improved efficiency,
including where non-exhaustive fault injection is performed
in order to reduce the resource cost of conducting exhaustive
experiments under a simultaneous fault model.
A. Contributions
This paper makes several specific contributions to the design
of efficient EDMs for practical software. In particular, the
research presented demonstrates that:
• Efficient EDMs can be designed using fault injection data
collected under models accounting for the occurrence of
simultaneous faults;
• Exhaustive fault injection under a simultaneous bit flip
model can yield better EDM efficiency than under a non-
simultaneous fault model;
• Exhaustive fault injection under a simultaneous bit flip
model can be made non-exhaustive without sacrificing
the efficiency of the resultant EDMs, thus reducing the
resource costs of experimentation to a practicable level.
The overarching contribution of this paper is to demonstrate
a practicable simultaneous fault model for the generation of
efficient EDMs based on the application of machine learning to
software fault injection data. In keeping with the simultaneous
fault models employed, the generated EDMs are resilient to
the single-fault assumption that limits the true efficiency and
relevance of EDMs currently designed using such an approach.
B. Paper Structure
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section II
provides an overview of research relating to fault models for
detector design. System III details the adopted system, data
and fault models. Section IV provides an overview of how
machine learning algorithms can be used to generate detection
predicates for specified software locations. Section V provides
details of the experiments conducted in this paper, including
details of target software systems and applied machine learning
algorithms. Section VI presents the results of the experiments
conducted, alongside a discussion of their significance in
the context of efficient error detector design. Section VII
concludes the paper with a summary of findings and a brief
discussion of future work in EDM design.
II. RELATED WORK
A fault model has been shown to be composed of two parts,
a local model and a global model [11]. The local fault model
states the type of faults that are assumed to occur, whilst
the global model dictates the extent to which the local fault
model can occur. Ideally software should be examined under
a representative workload and fault model. However, analyses
under such circumstances can be impractical due to numbers
of test cases or the fault space, particularly in the case of
simultaneous fault models that demand consideration of fault
combinations. Research has addressed these problems through
leveraging parallel architectures in the execution of the large
number of fault injection experiments [12], [13], though more
scalable techniques have focused on sampling strategies for
the test cases and error spaces [14], [15], [16].
The origin of the established bit flip fault model is in
the diagnosis of hardware faults. In the context of software
fault injection, bit flip and stuck-at fault models are often
used to mimic transient and permanent hardware faults [17].
There has been much research on the representativeness of
the faults captured by fault models used in software fault
injection, motivated by results showing the issue can impact
the validity of fault injection analysis. Results presented in [16]
demonstrated that representativeness and resource efficiency
in fault injection can be improved through the use of machine
learning techniques and software metrics, a departure from
fault-type focused approaches [18], [19].
The simultaneous fault models evaluated in this paper were
proposed in [20] in response to a proliferation of software
fault injection frameworks making the single-fault assumption,
despite this being known to be unrealistic [8]. The models
were developed on notions of coincidence and impact before
being evaluated with regard to utility using metrics such as
coverage and failure induction. Note that this focus is distinct
from research exploring the simultaneous execution of fault
injection experiments [21].
The focus of this paper is on the generation of efficient
error detection predicates for EDMs under simultaneous fault
models. The application of machine learning to EDM design
is appealing because it does not assume the availability of
a formal system specification [22] or rely on the experience
of software engineers [23], the application of each has been
shown to provide low efficiencies [24]. The approach is also
applicable to practical software systems, as opposed to EDM
design for smaller finite-state constructions [25]. Given that
simultaneous fault models are more representative of practical
software than models used to-date, the efficiencies presented
in this paper provide a more representative commentary for the
efficacy of machine learning as an EDM design approach.
III. MODELS
In this section the system, fault and data models used in this
paper are described.
A. System Model
A software system S is taken to be a tuple, consisting of a
set of software modules, M1 . . .Mn, and a set of connections.
A software module Mk consists of an import interface Ik,
an export interface Ek, a set of non-composite program
variables Vk and a sequence of actions Ak1 . . . Aki. Each
program variable in Vk has a domain of values. Each action in
Ak1 . . . Aki may read or write to a subset of Vk. Two software
modules Mk and Ml are connected if the export interface
of Mk is matched with the import interface of Ml, i.e., a
connection exists if Ek is matched with Il. Thus, a software
system S = (MOD,CON), where MOD = {M1 . . .Mn},
and CON = {(Mak ,Mal )}, where Mk exports to the import
interface of Ml over connection a. The adopted system model
is consistent with [10] and compatible with the simultaneous
fault models developed in [20].
2
B. Fault Models
The simultaneous fault models described were developed to
improve software fault injection by overcoming the single-fault
assumption, thus permitting more meaningful analyses [20].
As the fault injection conducted in [20] focused on the
point of entry to modules, the fault injection experiments in
this paper focus on generating EDMs at the entry points to
modules, an approach supported by existing research [26]. To
maintain compatibility with existing research, software state
was characterised by all variables in scope at the point of fault
injection. All variables in scope were subject to fault injection
experiments. The described fault models were systematically
applied to exhaustive combinations of variables in scope, e.g.,
if n variables were in scope then each fault model was applied
to every k-combination for 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
Fault models were used only for the collection of software
fault injection data that served as input to the machine
learning algorithms, i.e., the machine learning used took no
account of the fault model or data generation process.
Bit Flip (BF)
The BF fault model injects a single bit flip fault into the
representation of a single variable in each fault injection
experiment, thus incorporating the single-fault assumption
and providing a broad basis for comparison with simultaneous
fault models. This is a well established model for software
fault injection, being consistent with fault model used in
previous work on the application of machine learning for the
generation of efficient EDMs [10], [17], [27].
Simultaneous Fuzzing (FuzzFuzz)
A single fuzzing injection involves the modification of a
variable value to a random value of the same bit length. If
fuzzing were simultaneously applied to a single variable,
the result would not differ from a single fuzzing injection.
This means there is no need to consider injection in the
same variable. Rather, under the FuzzFuzz model, the
values of more than one target variable are subject to
fuzzing. Exhaustive software fault injection using fuzzing is
impractical, since the number of possible injection values
for an n-bit variable v is 2n. For this reason we restrict
experimentation to a fixed number of fault injections for each
variable combination simultaneous targeted under FuzzFuzz,
adhering to the experimental guidance derived from results
presented in [20] and [28].
Simultaneous Bit Flip (SimBF)
The SimBF fault model performs fault injections at the
resolution of a single variable. In the original formulation
of the model, only combinations of two bit flips were con-
sidered [20]. To ensure that initial experiments under this
model could be said to exhaustive, bit flip fault injection was
systemically applied to exhaustive k-combination combina-
tions of bits in each variable representation. Coupled with
the exhaustive consideration of k-combinations of variables
in which to inject, this fault model requires a large number
of experiments to consider exhaustively. It should be noted
that this large number of experiments is not practical at larger
scales. An exhaustive approach is initially adopted in this
paper to set a standard for EDM efficiencies, such that the
efficiencies of EDMs generated by non-exhaustive approaches
can be better understood.
C. Data Model
In the application of machine learning, data pertaining to a
real-world process is typically modelled as a set of entities,
their attributes and their known relationship to other entities.
This is commonly known as the relational model of data.
Data generated, hence stored, within such a relational data
model is a sample of all the data that may be generated by
the process. Often, rather than being interested in the retrieval
of stored data, it is more interesting and useful to be able to
forecast behaviours of the process not previously encountered
or derive knowledge about the process if the process itself
is not well understood. For example, in the context of the
research presented in this paper, it is interesting to understand
how a software under test, as the process modelled, is likely
to behave when confronted with an injected fault.
IV. EDM GENERATION USING MACHINE LEARNING
Recall that the effectiveness of an EDM has been shown to
depend the error detection predicate it implements and its
location in software. If the software location is known, EDM
generation entails the generation of an error detection predicate
for implementation, typically as a runtime assertion.
The premise of using machine learning on fault injection
data is that the data generated during fault injection analysis
captures aspects of the relationships between current software
states and future system failure. Based on the software states
sampled during fault injection analysis, machine learning
algorithms can be applied to learn the relationship between
the execution state of the software, as embodied by the values
of all variables in scope, and the notion of system failure.
As data collected during fault injection analysis provides an
indication of whether a sampled software state resulted in a
failure, the generation of a an error detection predicate from
that data is a supervised learning problem. Data is assumed to
exist as a single relation consisting of a set of n input attributes
that define an n-dimensional space called the Instance Space,
I . Every point in I is a potential state of the process being
modelled. In supervised learning a data mining algorithm is
tasked with learning a good approximation, fˆ , of an unknown
function f , referred to as the target function, given a training
data set, T ⊆ I , consisting of the N pairs 〈xi, f(xi)〉. If the
function is discrete then the task is referred to as classification.
In the case of learning a function from data generated during
fault injection, the function known to be binary. This is because
a software state either leads to a system failure or a successful
execution. The task of learning a binary function is referred to
as concept learning, which is a special case of classification.
Within a data set, instances of the class of interest, known as
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the concept, are referred to as positive instances. Instances not
belonging to the concept are referred to as negative instances.
A process for EDM generation using machine learning
on fault injection data is described in [10]. The process
consists of four generic stages, followed by the evaluation of
detection efficiency. The stages of the process, as reflected
in Sections IV-A- IV-E, are: Data Collection ( IV-A), Data
Preprocessing ( IV-B), Model Generation ( IV-C), Model
Refinement ( IV-D), and Model Evaluation ( IV-E).
A. Data Collection
The fault injection process in this context is a means for the
generation of data that captures the functional relationship
between software state and system failure. To a large extent,
the fault model applied in fault injection dictates the nature
and extent of the exploration of software states, making the
selection and robust application of a representative fault model
imperative. The exploration of simultaneous fault models is
the fundamental concern of this paper, focusing fault injection
analysis on the fault models described in Section III.
B. Data Preprocessing
Data preprocessing is performed to transform collected fault
injection data, the format of which varies by fault injection
framework, into a suitable relational data format for learning.
This transformation provides an opportunity to address issues
such as class imbalance, which can prevent the development of
reliable predictive models in concept learning problems [29].
In particular, data sets resulting from fault injection analysis
often contain significantly fewer instances of system failure
than instances of successful software execution. This feature of
the fault injection data must be accounted for before predictive
models are generated. This is an appropriate point at which to
tackle this problem because most approaches to address class
imbalance require the generation of derivative data sets, a task
made simpler if these are produced during data transformation.
C. Model Generation
Symbolic pattern learning algorithms are an effective class
of algorithm for the generation of error detection predicates,
not least because their output can easily be interpreted as
first-order predicates. This paper applies the decision tree
induction and rule induction as machine learning algorithms,
since these have been shown to be capable of generating
efficient, in some cases near-perfect, predicates for EDMs.
The function approximation learnt, referred to as the model,
by a classification algorithm needs to be evaluated, in order
to obtain a measure of the expected accuracy of the model on
unseen data. Typically the accuracy of a model is measured
by the percentage of test data instances correctly classified,
hence most algorithms seek to learn hypotheses that minimise
the number of errors. Conveniently this is consistent with the
notions of accuracy and completeness used in the measurement
of EDM efficiency. However, this implicitly assumes that all
types of misclassification incur an equal cost, which is not
always the case. For example, in the case of safety-critical
TABLE I: The general confusion matrix for concept learning.
Predicted Class
Pos. Neg. Margina Sum
Actual
Pos. TP FN npos
Neg. FP TN nneg
Marginal Sums nˆpos nˆneg n
software, a model incorrectly classifying a failure-inducing
state will typically result in a much more significant cost than a
non-failure-inducing state being classified as failure-inducing.
D. Model Refinement
The models generated are refined by varying the parameters
associated with the configuration of the associated machine
learning algorithms. In practice this is realised by repeating the
execution of the algorithms under different configurations on
the undersampled and oversampled data sets generated during
preprocessing in order to establish an algorithm configuration
and data set which yields the most efficient error detection
predicate. Achieving a perfect detector may not be possible for
a given location. This is not a direct limitation of the machine
learning approach, rather it is a theoretical constraint of the
EDM design problem [7].
E. Model Evaluation
The predictions of a model for a data set under test can be
cross-tabulated with the actual classes assigned to the instances
by the target function to produce a confusion matrix. Table I
shows the general form of a confusion matrix for concept
learning. TP is the number of positives instances labelled
as positive instances by fˆ , known as true positives, whilst
FN is the number of positive instances labelled as negative,
known as false negatives. FP is the number of negative
instances labelled as positive, known as false positives, whilst
TN is the number of negative instances labelled as negative,
known as true negatives. Finally, npos/nneg are the number of
positive/negative instances in the test data and nˆpos/nˆneg are
the number of instances predicted as positive / negative.
Aggregate measures of model quality seek to balance the
concerns of the confusion matrix shown in Table I. The most
basic of these measures are true negative rate (TNR) and true
positive rate (TPR).
TNR =
TN
TN + FP
(1)
TPR =
TP
TP + FN
(2)
These measures give rise to ROC analysis, which is based on
a plot in two dimensions where each model is a point defined
by the coordinates (1-TNR, TPR). Note that (1-TNR) is also
referred to as the false positive rate (FPR).
FPR =
FP
TN + FP
(3)
Under different configurations, the same classifier will produce
multiple points on such a plot. The area under the curve (AUC)
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obtained by joining these points to (0,0) and (1,1) is arguably
the most common measure of model performance. As the
focus of this paper is on evaluating the impact of more realistic
fault models on EDM efficiency, understood as their accuracy
and completeness, AUC is used in model evaluation.
AUC =
TPR− FPR+ 1
2
(4)
Since misclassification costs are likely to vary in the context
of dependable software systems, steps must be taken to ensure
that high AUC values are not achieved through the neglect of
accuracy or completeness. With this in mind, TPR and FPR
are also considered in model evaluation.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section the experimental approach employed in this
paper is explained, including coverage of the target software
systems and machine learning algorithms.
A. Data Collection
Four target software systems were subject to experimentation.
Five randomly chosen modules in each system were chosen for
experimentation. Failures were identified through comparison
with a fault-free execution, where any discrepancy in output
or the completion of the test case was deemed a failure.
7-Zip Archiving Utility (7Z): 7-Zip is a compression utility that
supports archiving and encryption [30]. 7-Zip is widely-used,
modular, written in C/C++ and has been designed, developed
and maintained by a community of software engineers. Most
source code and resources for 7-Zip are freely available
under the GNU Lesser General Public License. A single file
archiving procedure was executed as a test case.
FlightGear Flight Simulator (FG): FlightGear is an open
source flight simulator [31]. The software is modular, contains
more than 250,000 lines of C/C++ and simulates a safety
critical situation. All source code and resources for FlightGear
Flight Simulator are available under the GNU General Public
License. A takeoff procedure was executed as a test case.
MP3Gain (MG): MP3Gain is an open source volume
normaliser [32]. MP3Gain is modular, written in C/C++
and has been predominantly developed by a single software
engineer. All source code for MP3Gain is available under
the GNU General Public License. A single file volume
normalisation procedure was executed as a test case.
ImageMagick (IM): ImageMagick is an open source image
editing suite that can be utilised from the command line [33].
ImageMagick is modular, written in C/C++ and has been de-
signed, developed and maintained by a small team of software
engineers. All source code and resources for ImageMagick are
available under the Apache 2.0 license. A colour balancing,
crop and scaling image procedure was executed as a test case.
TRUE (148)
TRUE (249)
FALSE (126)
FALSE (59)
TRUE (119)
TRUE (49)TRUE (52)
VarOne
VarThreeVarTwo
VarSixVarFour
VarFive
VarSix
VarFive
VarSix
VarSeven
VarTwo
VarFour
< 43.32 ≥ 43.32
< 42 ≥ 42
> 523 ≤ 523 > -0.99 ≤ -0.99
> 0 ≤ 0 > 1 ≤ 1 > 522 ≤ 522
> 0 ≤ 0 > 10 ≤ 10
Fig. 1: Example decision tree generated under C4.5 [10].
B. Data Preprocessing
The data generated during fault injection was stored using the
PROPANE logging format, though the lack of simultaneous
fault model support meant a bespoke framework was used for
the injection of faults [34]. This meant a format transformation
between the PROPANE logging format and the Attribute
Relation File Format (ARFF) used by the Weka Data Mining
suite for model generation [35]. In this format, each variable
in scope is an attribute and the class label identifies failures.
There are two approaches for addressing class imbalanced
data sets. Either the data distribution can be implicitly changed
or the data set can be resampled to make the class distribution
more uniform. The former is commonly achieved through the
association of weights with training examples [36], [37]. The
main problem with this in the context of EDM generation
is the identification of appropriate weights. Resampling to
make the class distribution more uniform does not suffer
from this issue, since it is achieved by oversampling the
minority class or, more commonly, undersampling the majority
class [38], [39]. Hence, Synthetic Minority Oversampling
Technique (SMOTE) was used to address class imbalance.
This approach generates synthetic samples for minority classes
along the line segment joining an example to k-minority class
nearest neighbours, with cross validation being used to set the
level of oversampling and undersampling of the majority and
minority classes [40], [41].
C. Model Generation
The Weka Data Mining suite provided the implementation of
the algorithms used in model generation [35]. In particular,
Weka provided implementation of the C4.5 decision tree
induction and Repeated Incremental Pruning to Produce Error
Reduction (RIPPER) algorithms [42], [43].
Decision tree induction learns a disjunction of conjunctive
rules describing a concept. As shown in Figure 1, a decision
tree consists of two node types; decision nodes and leaf
nodes. A decision node contains an input attribute value. Each
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edge emanating from a decision node is labelled with one
of the unique values in the domain of the attribute labelling
the decision node. A leaf node is labelled using one of the
classification labels. Each path of the tree from the root
node to a leaf node is interpreted as a set of conjunctive
expressions that lead to the classification label at the leaf node.
The algorithm performs a greedy search of the space of all
possible trees choosing decision node attributes that maximise
the reduction in entropy of the class label.
Rule Induction operates in distinct phases. Specifically,
beginning with with the least represented class label, the
algorithm repeatedly grows and prunes rules until there are
no positive examples left or the error rate is greater than
0.5. A rule is grown by incorporating greedy conditions until
the rule is perfectly accurate. This is done by attempting
to incorporate every possible value of each attribute and
selecting the condition providing most information gain. A
rule is pruned by removing any final sequences of antecedents
according to a fixed pruning metric, providing some facility
to incorporate domain knowledge and combat overfitting.
D. Model Refinement
A total of 20 undersampling and 15 oversampling levels were
used in model refinement. These levels were distributed over
[5,100] and [100,1500] for undersampling and oversampling
respectively. The number of nearest neighbours considered in
the sampling process were uniformly distributed over [1,15].
These ranges were chosen arbitrarily to provide insight into
achievable improvement, as opposed to performing a search
of configurations in pursuit of optimal model performance.
E. EDM Evaluation
Following the application of each machine learning algorithm
to each fault injection data set, 10-fold cross validation was
used to generate the confusion matrices. The use of 10-fold
cross validation meant that the entries in each data set are
partitioned into 10 stratified samples, then for each cross
validation run, one of these partitions is used as a test sample,
whilst the other nine partitions are used as the training set for
a particular machine learning algorithm.
VI. RESULTS
Following the application of the machine learning algorithms
to each of the generated fault injection data sets, including
undersampled and oversampled data, 10-fold cross validation
was used to generate the confusion matrix for each algorithm
on each data set. The use of 10-fold cross validation meant
that the entries in each data set are partitioned into 10 stratified
samples, then for each cross validation run, one of these
partitions is used as a test sample, whilst the other nine are
used as the training set for a particular algorithm.
Sections VI-A- VI-E present results for the error detection
predicates learnt under varying fault models. For each of the
machine learning algorithms applied, results are presented
for the error detection predicates generated before and after
optimisation. All optimisation performed in this paper was
achieved through varying parameters that are independent of
any data mining algorithm, i.e., the data set sampling levels
applied prior to model generation. This ensures that the same
refinement process can be applied regardless of the selected
algorithm. In the tables presented in Sections VI-A to VI-E,
the FPR and TPR columns give the mean false positive
and true positive rates taken across ten cross validations. A
true positive corresponds to a model correctly identifying a
failure-inducing state, whereas a false positive corresponds to
a model incorrectly detecting a state as being failure-inducing.
The AUC column shows the area under the ROC curve, the
aggregate measure of efficiency that balances the consideration
of TRP against FPR. The Var column gives the AUC variance
across all ten cross validations, providing an indication of how
consistently efficient models were generated.
A. BF Fault Model
Evaluating error detection predicates generated under the non-
simultaneous BF fault model provides a convenient benchmark
for the analysis of simultaneous fault models. It is desirable for
error detection predicates generated under any simultaneous
fault models to maintain the high efficiency and low variance
that is associated with error detection predicates generated by
the same approach under a non-simultaneous fault model.
Table II demonstrates levels of efficiency commensurate
with those previously observed when using decision tree
induction and rule induction algorithms to generate error
detection predicates [10]. The hallmarks of these algorithms
for predicate generation can be seen in the consistently high
AUC values, ranging from 0.89161 to 0.99991 for decision
tree induction and from 0.88873 to 0.99780 for rule induction.
Decision tree induction is the better performing of the two
model generation algorithms, with higher TPR in most cases,
another observation that is commensurate with existing work
in machine learning for error detection predicate generation.
An AUC of 0.90411 or higher can be found for every module
subject to analysis, an indication that the predicates generated
are effective classifiers for failure inducing states. It can also
be observed that whilst some generated detectors were perfect
with respect to accuracy (TPR = 1) and some perfect with
respect to completeness (FPR = 0), no perfect detector
(TRP = 1, FPR = 0) was generated.
B. FuzzFuzz Fault Model
The FuzzFuzz model is the first simultaneous fault model to
be analysed. As the space of possible fault injections under the
FuzzFuzz fault model makes exhaustive injections impractical,
since the number of possible injection values for an single n-
bit variable v is 2n, experimentation was restricted to a fixed
number of fault injections for each combination of variables
simultaneously targeted. Table III and Table IV present results
where the number of fault injections for each combination of
variables simultaneously targeted is 30 and 100 respectively.
The error detection predicate efficiencies shown in Table III
would be inappropriate for implementation in a EDM, since
the highest AUC value across all models is 0.81939. However,
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TABLE II: The efficiency of error detection predicates generated and evaluated under the BF fault model.
Decision Tree Induction Rule Induction
Software Module TPR FPR AUC Var TPR FPR AUC Var
7Z 1 0.99849 0.00100 0.99875 6E-07 0.96456 0.00157 0.98150 7E-04
2 0.99914 0.00009 0.99953 8E-08 0.98554 0.01241 0.98657 1E-05
3 0.99826 0.00002 0.99912 2E-09 0.93912 0.07671 0.93120 6E-06
4 0.95422 0.00210 0.97606 5E-04 0.94685 0.06631 0.94027 5E-05
5 0.96010 0.00090 0.97960 5E-07 0.93022 0.06467 0.93278 1E-04
FG 1 0.79633 0.01311 0.89161 2E-05 0.94151 0.09568 0.92291 5E-04
2 0.99982 0.00000 0.99991 2E-10 0.98244 0.00420 0.98912 5E-05
3 0.99662 0.00111 0.99776 8E-08 0.98786 0.00033 0.99376 8E-05
4 0.93889 0.00235 0.96827 4E-06 0.87776 0.00677 0.93550 4E-02
5 0.94427 0.04322 0.94350 4E-04 0.92419 0.01097 0.95661 8E-04
IM 1 0.83867 0.00633 0.91617 7E-04 0.81423 0.00766 0.90329 9E-03
2 0.86937 0.02012 0.92463 9E-05 0.82677 0.02657 0.90010 4E-03
3 0.94789 0.00091 0.97349 1E-04 0.86754 0.00675 0.93040 5E-02
4 0.93159 0.00459 0.96350 1E-03 0.82377 0.00950 0.90714 1E-05
5 0.91831 0.00842 0.95495 5E-03 0.84434 0.00905 0.91765 4E-02
MG 1 1.00000 0.00990 0.99505 1E-12 0.97130 0.00001 0.98565 4E-05
2 0.97403 0.00000 0.98702 1E-32 0.99559 0.00000 0.99780 9E-06
3 0.99380 0.00000 0.99690 1E-32 0.90587 0.04206 0.93190 7E-07
4 0.82290 0.01469 0.90411 3E-07 0.81036 0.00177 0.90430 2E-05
5 0.85073 0.00349 0.92362 1E-04 0.79360 0.01614 0.88873 7E-02
TABLE III: The efficiency of error detection predicates generated and evaluated under the FuzzFuzz fault model with 30 fault
injection experiments for each combination of target variables.
Decision Tree Induction Rule Induction
System Module TPR FPR AUC Var TPR FPR AUC Var
7Z 1 0.64430 0.17731 0.73350 5E-02 0.55872 0.28880 0.63496 7E-03
2 0.59887 0.23541 0.68173 7E-02 0.51426 0.28823 0.61302 2E-03
3 0.54452 0.04431 0.75011 9E-04 0.52676 0.04493 0.74092 7E-03
4 0.63089 0.08624 0.77233 9E-02 0.50364 0.08907 0.70729 9E-03
5 0.56538 0.00793 0.77873 1E-02 0.50114 0.00960 0.74577 9E-03
FG 1 0.67200 0.04847 0.81177 3E-02 0.53404 0.03964 0.74720 6E-03
2 0.61528 0.00626 0.80451 5E-03 0.53584 0.01239 0.76173 6E-03
3 0.52155 0.06680 0.72738 1E-02 0.51829 0.06821 0.72504 9E-04
4 0.69746 0.08621 0.80563 6E-02 0.58829 0.08780 0.75025 7E-03
5 0.53417 0.00917 0.76250 1E-03 0.51322 0.04446 0.73438 4E-03
IM 1 0.61181 0.00258 0.80462 5E-02 0.51907 0.04399 0.73754 6E-02
2 0.61151 0.04591 0.78280 8E-03 0.60607 0.04972 0.77818 4E-03
3 0.64896 0.01207 0.81845 2E-02 0.54398 0.06983 0.73708 5E-03
4 0.66317 0.02439 0.81939 3E-03 0.53377 0.04608 0.74385 5E-03
5 0.62518 0.00411 0.81054 8E-04 0.50813 0.00966 0.74924 1E-03
MG 1 0.53590 0.00987 0.76302 1E-03 0.50873 0.03244 0.73815 9E-03
2 0.63777 0.00879 0.81449 5E-04 0.54761 0.00956 0.76903 8E-02
3 0.55767 0.01651 0.77058 1E-03 0.51580 0.12764 0.69408 4E-03
4 0.57714 0.03535 0.77090 8E-03 0.52553 0.08434 0.72060 4E-02
5 0.52629 0.00890 0.75870 1E-02 0.50150 0.01485 0.74333 5E-02
Table IV demonstrates that it is possible to generate efficient
error detection predicates under a fuzzing model. Note that the
efficiencies of these error detection predicates are below those
observed under the BF fault model, both in this paper and in
existing research, with an aggregate mean AUC of 0.90493.
It should be remembered that the levels of performance are
not to the detriment of the simultaneous fault model, since
the associated the set of injected faults will result in greater
perturbation of software state. Intuitively, the impact of fuzzing
for a fixed number of repeats is to incur a less structured
and thorough exploration of erroneous software state, thus
making it more difficult for a machine learning algorithm to
discern the relationship between erroneous software state and
system failure. This intuition is substantiated by the marked
improvement the efficiencies of the error detection predicates
generated using a larger number of fault injection experiments
for each combination of target variables.
C. SimBF Fault Model
The SimBF fault model is the most computationally expensive
set of experiments presented in this paper, since bit flip fault
injection was applied to exhaustive combinations of bits in
each variable representation across exhaustive combinations
of variables. Whilst polynomial in bit representation and the
number of variables, conducting this number of experiments
in the development of most software systems is impractical.
Despite this, the efficiencies shown are the strongest presented
and warrant consideration regardless of the cost incurred.
Table V shows that a perfect error detection predicate was
generated under the SimBF fault model. The perfect detector
is associated with module FG-2, though the error detection
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TABLE IV: The efficiency of error detection predicates generated and evaluated under the FuzzFuzz fault model with 100
fault injection experiments for each combination of target variables.
Decision Tree Induction Rule Induction
System Module TPR FPR AUC Var TPR FPR AUC Var
7Z 1 0.92298 0.08920 0.91689 7E-05 0.85316 0.00538 0.92389 9E-02
2 0.89798 0.00161 0.94819 3E-04 0.81497 0.00887 0.90305 2E-02
3 0.84798 0.00944 0.91927 2E-05 0.79370 0.01118 0.89126 6E-01
4 0.89089 0.06959 0.91065 4E-03 0.79718 0.00204 0.89757 9E-03
5 0.83002 0.00933 0.91035 3E-03 0.78101 0.00145 0.88978 7E-02
FG 1 0.75158 0.02956 0.86101 5E-06 0.77264 0.01997 0.87634 9E-02
2 0.88952 0.00260 0.94346 1E-06 0.75132 0.00987 0.87073 1E-02
3 0.91492 0.06680 0.92406 9E-07 0.83180 0.06126 0.88527 2E-03
4 0.89191 0.00876 0.94158 5E-05 0.88171 0.03874 0.92149 1E-02
5 0.83837 0.00714 0.91562 7E-05 0.80233 0.02890 0.88672 1E-02
IM 1 0.78233 0.00126 0.89054 7E-02 0.81423 0.04303 0.88560 2E-01
2 0.71151 0.00638 0.85257 2E-03 0.82677 0.02987 0.89845 9E-02
3 0.83389 0.00342 0.91524 2E-03 0.86754 0.06319 0.90218 6E-02
4 0.73310 0.02439 0.85436 8E-04 0.82377 0.04415 0.88981 2E-02
5 0.81016 0.00330 0.90343 2E-02 0.84434 0.00750 0.91842 9E-04
MG 1 0.82051 0.00583 0.90734 1E-05 0.97130 0.00761 0.98185 7E-02
2 0.84187 0.00035 0.92076 1E-03 0.99559 0.00319 0.99620 5E-03
3 0.77253 0.00716 0.88269 4E-03 0.90587 0.09489 0.90549 2E-02
4 0.76022 0.01853 0.87085 1E-03 0.81036 0.03768 0.88634 1E-02
5 0.82237 0.00299 0.90969 2E-03 0.79360 0.01193 0.89084 4E-02
TABLE V: The efficiency of error detection predicates generated and evaluated under the SimBF fault model.
Decision Tree Induction Rule Induction
System Module TPR FPR AUC Var TPR FPR AUC Var
7Z 1 0.99988 0.00005 0.99992 2E-14 0.96484 0.00063 0.98211 2E-02
2 0.99974 0.00003 0.99986 9E-08 0.99744 0.00670 0.99537 9E-03
3 0.99964 0.00001 0.99982 5E-08 0.94111 0.00948 0.96582 3E-02
4 0.98831 0.00031 0.99400 1E-05 0.95326 0.00311 0.97508 2E-03
5 0.97990 0.00078 0.98956 3E-03 0.95828 0.03180 0.96324 1E-03
FG 1 0.89734 0.00433 0.94651 1E-06 0.94151 0.00136 0.97008 7E-03
2 1.00000 0.00000 1.00000 1E-19 0.98655 0.00360 0.99148 5E-02
3 0.99710 0.00057 0.99827 7E-09 0.99121 0.00020 0.99551 3E-02
4 0.94179 0.00167 0.97006 5E-06 0.91728 0.00310 0.95709 1E-03
5 0.96588 0.04672 0.95958 7E-05 0.93679 0.00224 0.96728 8E-02
IM 1 0.97914 0.00633 0.98641 4E-06 0.90968 0.00243 0.95363 9E-02
2 0.97927 0.00040 0.98944 7E-05 0.89180 0.00241 0.94470 6E-02
3 1.00000 0.00006 0.99997 1E-32 0.92153 0.00547 0.95803 3E-02
4 0.98926 0.00459 0.99234 3E-03 0.86372 0.08034 0.89169 9E-03
5 0.99956 0.00031 0.99963 1E-11 0.93834 0.00635 0.96600 2E-02
MG 1 1.00000 0.00004 0.99998 1E-32 0.98766 0.00043 0.99362 2E-03
2 0.99855 0.00000 0.99928 1E-32 0.99598 0.00035 0.99782 9E-04
3 0.99964 0.00000 0.99982 1E-32 0.91953 0.00101 0.95926 3E-02
4 0.94480 0.00235 0.97123 4E-03 0.80133 0.00338 0.89898 8E-02
5 0.95439 0.00126 0.97657 2E-03 0.79408 0.01217 0.89096 3E-02
predicated associated with several other modules, most notably
IM-3 and MG-1, are near perfect. The aggregate mean AUC
for decision tree induction is 0.98861, meaning that it is
once again the better performing of the two model generation
algorithms. This is higher than the 0.93667 recorded under the
BF fault model, despite SimBF being the stronger of the two
fault models in terms of the faults imposed / perturbation of
software state. Supporting preliminary findings in [10], this is
an indication that a comprehensive exploration of erroneous
software states is fundamental to the generation of efficient
error detection predicates using machine learning.
D. Simultaneous Fault Model Efficacy
Although simultaneous fault models are proposed to be more
representative and cross validation allow the efficiency of the
generated error detection predicates to be evaluated, gaining
insight into the efficacy of simultaneous fault models is
challenging. It is natural to consider the extent to which the
error detection predicates generated under a simultaneous fault
model can account for the set of faults injected under a non-
simultaneous model, since the latter is commonly used to
inform EDM design. This is achieved by determining whether
the error detection predicates generated under the SimBF fault
model account for the faults injected under the BF fault model.
These models are related, in that the set of faults injected under
the BF fault model is a strict subset of the set of faults injected
under the SimBF fault model.
The unsampled BF data set was evaluated against the best
performing error detection predicates generated under the
SimBF fault model. Table VI shows the efficiency of error
detection predicates generated under the SimBF fault model
8
and evaluated under the BF fault model. The efficiencies of
the error detection predicates generated under the SimBF fault
model when confronted by the set of faults associated with
the BF fault model demonstrate the utility of simultaneous
fault models. Once again, the more comprehensive exploration
of erroneous state under the SimBF fault model enables the
resultant error detection predicates to be more accurate and
complete than those generated under the BF fault model. Most
notably, at least one perfect detector has been generated for at
least one module in each software system.
Simultaneous fault models aim to be more representative of
faults that occur in real-world software. Whilst it can not be
argued that results presented in Table VI further the argument
of representativeness beyond what is shown in [20], the results
are a strong indication that simultaneous fault model provides
considerations over and above the widely used BF model.
E. Restricted SimBF Fault Model
Having demonstrated the set of fault injections associated
with BF is accounted for under SimBF, it is reasonable that
SimBF could be used in fault injection analysis, not least with
regard to the transient and permanent hardware faults that BF
is commonly used to emulate. However, the computational
expense of performing bit flip fault injection on exhaustive
combinations of bits in each variable representation makes the
model impractical for many software validation processes.
The problem of impractical experimental cost can be solved
by restricting the number of fault injections performed or
developing a strategy to intelligently sample the error space.
To this point simultaneous bit flip fault injections have been
exhaustive. That is, if n variables were in scope then the fault
model was exhaustively applied to the representation of every
k-combination of variables for 1 ≤ k ≤ n. By restricting
the faults injected to being in every k-combination of bits
in the representation for 1 ≤ k ≤ 2 and, similarly only
k-combinations of variables for 1 ≤ k ≤ 2, the number
of experiments is dramatically reduced whilst preserving the
essence of simultaneous fault injection.
Table VII shows the performance of the generated error
detection predicates when simultaneous bit flip fault injection
is restricted to every k-combination of bits in representation
for 1 ≤ k ≤ 2 and k-combinations of variables for 1 ≤ k ≤ 2.
This reduces the number of fault injection experiments on a
single variable from
(
n
1
)
+
(
n
2
)
+ ...+
(
n
k
)
to
(
n
1
)
+
(
n
2
)
, where
n is the number of bits in the variable. Similarly reducing the
number of variable combinations to
(
n
1
)
+
(
n
2
)
+
(
n
3
)
+ ...+
(
n
k
)
to
(
n
1
)
+
(
n
2
)
, where n is the number of variables in scope.
The performance of the error detection predicates generated
under the SimBF model with 2 or fewer simultaneous faults,
shown in Table VII, is identical to the performance of the
exhaustive SimBF model for all but five software modules. In
each of these cases the associated error detection predicates
have decreased in TPR and FPR, hence a commensurate
reduction in AUC, though the impact is less severe where the
error detection predicates are generated using rule induction.
The TPR, FPR and AUC values of the five impacted soft-
ware modules do not revert to the efficiencies of the BF model,
despite the restricted model retaining near-perfect detection
capability with regard to single fault injections. This represents
a further indication that the consideration of the simultaneous
fault model is providing greater depth of analysis, now at a
more reasonable experimental cost. It is similarly interesting to
note the consistency of the AUC variance across the exhaustive
and restricted models, suggesting near identical error detection
predicates are being generated, despite the cross validation
process excluding informative instances for evaluation.
Table VIII shows the performance of the generated error
detection predicates when simultaneous bit flip fault injection
is restricted to every k-combination for 1 ≤ k ≤ 3. This
increases the number of fault injection experiments conducted
for a single variable from
(
n
1
)
+
(
n
2
)
to
(
n
1
)
+
(
n
2
)
+
(
n
3
)
, where n
is the number of bits in the representation. Similarly increasing
the number of variables combinations to
(
n
1
)
+
(
n
2
)
to
(
n
1
)
+(
n
2
)
+
(
n
3
)
, where n is the number of variables in scope.
The performance of the error detection predicates generated
under SimBF with three or fewer simultaneous faults, shown
in Table VIII, builds on the performance of the model with
two or fewer simultaneous faults. The restricted model with
three or fewer simultaneous faults yields identical performance
to the exhaustive SimBF fault model for all but two software
modules, where these are limited to a single software system.
The results presented demonstrate that the Restricted SimBF
model provides a practical simultaneous fault model for the
generation of efficient EDMs based on the application of
machine learning to software fault injection data sets. The
efficiencies of the generated error detection predicates surpass
those of predicates generated under the BF model when
evaluated again non-simultaneous or simultaneous faults. It
should be noted that the results presented were derived under
synthetic workloads and simultaneous fault models developed
by existing research, a common limitation of work in the
design of error and anomaly detection approaches.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this section the contributions of this paper are summarised
and future work discussed.
A. Summary
The application of machine learning to fault injection data has
been shown to be amongst the most effective approaches for
the generation of efficient EDMs. However, such approaches
to design of EDMs have invariably adopted a fault model with
a single-fault assumption. Although simultaneous faults do not
necessarily exist in all scenarios, the single-fault assumption
limits the practical relevance of research in fault injection and
fails to recognise the demands of established safety standards.
This paper addresses this problem, demonstrating that efficient
EDMs can be generated using fault injection data collected
under fault models accounting for simultaneous faults. In
particular, it is shown that (i) efficient EDMs can be designed
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TABLE VI: The efficiency of error detection predicates generated under the SimBF fault model and evaluated against BF data.
Decision Tree Induction Rule Induction
System Module TPR FPR AUC Var TPR FPR AUC Var
7Z 1 0.99996 0.00000 0.99992 2E-15 0.99981 0.00007 0.99987 4E-08
2 1.00000 0.00000 1.00000 1E-32 1.00000 0.00110 0.99945 2E-09
3 1.00000 0.00000 1.00000 1E-32 1.00000 0.00000 1.00000 1E-32
4 0.99940 0.00002 0.99969 1E-32 0.99944 0.00050 0.99947 6E-15
5 0.99992 0.00048 0.99972 4E-29 0.98199 0.00104 0.99048 1E-04
FG 1 0.99866 0.00700 0.99583 4E-31 0.99711 0.00484 0.99614 2E-04
2 1.00000 0.00000 1.00000 1E-32 1.00000 0.00000 1.00000 1E-32
3 1.00000 0.00000 1.00000 1E-32 1.00000 0.00048 0.99976 2E-17
4 0.99990 0.00092 0.99949 8E-16 0.99990 0.00110 0.99940 4E-09
5 1.00000 0.00112 0.99944 9E-06 1.00000 0.00099 0.99951 3E-16
IM 1 0.99931 0.00031 0.99950 4E-06 0.99811 0.00031 0.99890 7E-02
2 0.99902 0.00000 0.99951 7E-05 0.99703 0.00000 0.99852 4E-09
3 1.00000 0.00000 1.00000 1E-32 1.00000 0.00060 0.99970 9E-15
4 1.00000 0.00192 0.99904 3E-03 1.00000 0.00422 0.99789 9E-18
5 1.00000 0.00001 1.00000 1E-11 1.00000 0.00080 0.99960 2E-29
MG 1 1.00000 0.00000 1.00000 1E-32 1.00000 0.00000 1.00000 1E-32
2 0.99906 0.00000 0.99953 1E-32 0.99900 0.00000 0.99950 9E-08
3 0.99999 0.00000 0.99999 2E-32 0.99999 0.00012 0.99994 3E-06
4 0.99917 0.00200 0.99859 8E-08 0.99907 0.00280 0.99814 2E-31
5 0.99909 0.00062 0.99924 5E-16 0.99890 0.00082 0.99904 1E-04
TABLE VII: The efficiency of error detection predicates generated and evaluated under the SimBF fault model with simultaneous
fault injections restricted to k-combinations of bits in representation and variables for 1 ≤ k ≤ 2.
Decision Tree Induction Rule Induction
System Module TPR FPR AUC Var TPR FPR AUC Var
7Z 1 0.99988 0.00005 0.99992 2E-14 0.96484 0.00063 0.98211 2E-02
2 1.00000 0.00000 1.00000 1E-19 0.98655 0.00360 0.99148 5E-02
3 0.99710 0.00057 0.99827 7E-09 0.99121 0.00020 0.99551 3E-02
4 0.96205 0.00170 0.98018 8E-06 0.94901 0.00311 0.97295 7E-03
5 0.97990 0.00078 0.98956 3E-03 0.95828 0.03180 0.96324 1E-03
FG 1 0.88218 0.00855 0.93682 1E-06 0.94151 0.00136 0.97008 7E-03
2 1.00000 0.00000 1.00000 1E-19 0.98655 0.00360 0.99148 5E-02
3 0.99710 0.00057 0.99827 7E-09 0.99121 0.00020 0.99551 3E-02
4 0.94004 0.00218 0.97006 4E-03 0.90948 0.00610 0.95709 8E-03
5 0.96588 0.04672 0.95958 7E-05 0.93679 0.00224 0.96728 8E-02
IM 1 0.97914 0.00633 0.98641 4E-06 0.90968 0.00243 0.95363 9E-02
2 0.97927 0.00040 0.98944 7E-05 0.89180 0.00241 0.94470 6E-02
3 1.00000 0.00080 0.99997 4E-32 0.92153 0.00547 0.95803 3E-02
4 0.98926 0.00459 0.99234 3E-03 0.86372 0.08034 0.89169 9E-03
5 0.99956 0.00031 0.99963 1E-11 0.93834 0.00635 0.96600 2E-02
MG 1 1.00000 0.00004 0.99998 1E-32 0.98766 0.00043 0.99362 2E-03
2 0.99855 0.00000 0.99928 1E-32 0.99598 0.00035 0.99782 9E-04
3 0.99964 0.00000 0.99982 1E-32 0.91953 0.00101 0.95926 3E-02
4 0.92249 0.00238 0.96006 5E-02 0.80100 0.00348 0.89876 8E-02
5 0.90100 0.00157 0.97657 2E-03 0.79408 0.01217 0.89096 3E-02
using fault data collected under models accounting for the oc-
currence of simultaneous faults, (ii) exhaustive fault injection
under a simultaneous bit flip model can yield improvements
to EDM efficiency, and (iii) exhaustive fault injection under a
simultaneous bit flip model can made non-exhaustive, thereby
reducing the resource costs of experimentation to practicable
levels, without sacrificing the efficiency of the resultant EDMs.
B. Future Work
The results presented have motivated further consideration of
simultaneous fault model representativeness. The examination
of fault injection data and efficient error detection predicates is
a means for gaining insight into fault model representativeness.
In contrast, the task of sampling error states and test cases
to reduce experimental cost is well researched. Despite this,
existing methods for error state and test case sampling require
domain knowledge. Examining the software states captured
by efficient error detection predicates will provide insight into
how to better sample error spaces and test cases.
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